

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 07799

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: USSR STATEMENT DELIVERED AT
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING ON MAY 19, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.216

1. COL. TARASOV (USSR) MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING HELD MAY 19: BEGIN TEXT:
AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND, THE US DELEGATION,
CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION OF
TREATY COMPLIANCE, INTRODUCED ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE OF
THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT AND OF TECHNICAL
ANNEXES THERETO.

TODAY, AT THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP,
WE WOULD LIKE TO STATE A NUMBER OF PRELIMINARY OBSERVA-
TIONS AND PROPOSALS ON "ILLUSTRATIVE TEXTS OF THE ARTICLE
AND THE TECHNICAL ANNEX OF THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION
AGREEMENT PERTAINING TO NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS."

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A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATERIAL UNDERTAKEN
BY THE EXPERTS OF OUR DELEGATION INDICATES THAT OUR
POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVE BECOME CLOSER. THUS,
WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL
SEISMIC STATIONS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE NEW US
PROPOSALS, AND THE QUESTION OF THEIR POSSIBLE CONTROL

BY MEANS OF RADIO COMMANDS SENT FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN. A CHANGED PROCEDURE FOR SITE SELECTION FOR NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS IS PROPOSED WHICH PROVIDES FOR LIMITING AND POSSIBLY EVEN EXCLUDING PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN THIS WORK. AND, FINALLY, THE TEXTS OF THE ARTICLE OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, IN THEIR FORM AND CONTENT, APPROXIMATE THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLE OF THE SOVIET ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

AT THE MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP OF MAY 16, THE US DELEGATION PROPOSED, AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, THAT WE DEFINE THE ISSUES ON WHICH WE COULD BEGIN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC DETAILS AND BEGIN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS WHICH THE US DELEGATION PROPOSED.

WE HAVE JUST STATED OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE TEXT OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. THIS TEXT, HOWEVER, IS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE TEXT OF THE TECHNICAL ANNEX THERETO AND, IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, WE STILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO DO ON THIS TEXT. IN THE COURSE OF THIS WORK WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED FROM SOLVING GENERAL, BASIC ISSUES TO SOLVING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, AS IS COMMONLY DONE.

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THE FIRST GENERAL QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE WHICH WE WOULD DEEM NECESSARY TO CONSIDER IS AS FOLLOWS. THE TECHNICAL ANNEX INTRODUCED BY THE US DELEGATION STARTS FROM THE BASIC PRESUPPOSITION THAT THE DOWNHOLE UNIT, AND POSSIBLY THE ENTIRE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION, WILL BE WHOLLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY THE UNITED STATES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ANNEX IS WRITTEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE DESIGN, TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, TECHNICAL AND DATA CAPACITIES OF THE SEISMIC STATION BEING DEVELOPED BY THE US. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE DATES PROVIDED FOR IN THE TECHNICAL ANNEX FOR PUTTING THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION INTO OPERATION ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE DATES OF DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF THESE SEISMIC STATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES.

THIS PREMISE FOR WORKING OUT THE TECHNICAL ANNEX DOES NOT SUIT US. INDEED, HAVING UNDERTAKEN OBLIGATIONS TO ADHERE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, THE STATES PARTY CANNOT UNDERTAKE THE OBLIGATION TO USE PRECISELY THIS US SEISMIC STATION FOR IMPLEMENTING SEISMIC VERIFICATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF

THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. THIS IS ALL THE MORE TRUE IN A SITUATION WHEN A TEST MODEL OF THE STATION IS NOT YET READY, AND WHEN THE STATION HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY TESTED FOR RELIABILITY AND ABILITY TO FUNCTION UNDER VARIOUS CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. THEREFORE, AT PRESENT WE CAN ONLY AGREE TO A CAREFUL AND UNBIASED CONSIDERATION OF THE TECHNICAL AND DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATIONS.

OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT THE TECHNICAL ANNEX SHOULD SPECIFY

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TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PROCEDURES FOR SITE SELECTION AND STATION MAINTENANCE IN A GENERAL WAY, NOT LINKING THEM WITH THE SPECIFIC DESIGN OF A NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION, BUT USING AS A BASIS THE STATION'S DESIGNATED PURPOSE.

IN SPEAKING OF THE DESIGNATED PURPOSE OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO RECALL ONCE AGAIN THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERED AN AUXILIARY MEANS OF VERIFICATION WHICH SUPPLEMENT THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY AND THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. NATURALLY, THE AUXILIARY MEANS OF VERIFICATION MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE BUT SIMPLE, AND THEIR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OVERALL MAIN SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY PROVISIONS SHOULD NOT REQUIRE CREATING SYSTEMS FOR INTERCONTINENTAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNPRECEDENTED IN

THEIR VOLUME OF DATA.

THE LATTER CIRCUMSTANCE, IN OUR OPINION, MAY CAUSE THE
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GREATEST COMPLICATIONS IN THE COURSE OF CREATING A
PRACTICALLY IMPLEMENTABLE SYSTEM OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF OUR NEGOTIATING
PARTNERS TO THE ADVISABILITY OF PRECISELY SUCH STRUCTUR-
ING OF THE TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION PERTAINING TO NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS.
GIVING TO THIS DOCUMENT THE FORM AND CONTENT WE PROPOSE
PROVIDES, IN OUR OPINION, THE PREREQUISITES FOR MOVING
TO THE WORKING OUT OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, BOTH OF THE TEXT
OF THE ARTICLE OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON SEISMIC
VERIFICATION AND THE ANNEX THERETO.

FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL MAKE THE
NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION IN THE WORKING OUT OF THIS ANNEX.
TODAY IN PARTICULAR WE WANT TO SET FORTH OUR THOUGHTS ON
THE FREQUENCY RANGE OF A SEISMIC STATION.

IN OUR OPINION, THE RECORDING FREQUENCY RANGE OF
NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS SHOULD BE FROM 10 TO 0.025 HZ.
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS IT IS SUFFICIENT TO HAVE WITHIN THE
RECORDING BAND THREE AXES OF THE SHORT-PERIOD RANGE AND
3 AXES OF THE MID-PERIOD RANGE, WITH SOME WIDENING OF
THE MID-PERIOD RANGE BAND TOWARDS LOW FREQUENCIES. THIS
WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE, WITHOUT LOWERING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTED IN THE FRAME-
WORK OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE
THE VOLUME OF DATA PROCESSED IN THE SYSTEM. ACCORDING
TO PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES, THE VOLUME OF DATA WILL THUS BE
REDUCED BY APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DESIGN OF THE NATIONAL SEISMIC
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STATION PROPOSED BY THE US, OUR PROPOSAL CAN BE REALIZED
BY MEANS OF APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT OF THE AMPLITUDE-
FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOWNHOLE PACKAGE.

WE ARE CONTINUING OUR CAREFUL STUDY OF THE MATERIAL
GIVEN US BY THE US DELEGATION ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS,

AND AS WE STUDY THIS MATERIAL WE WILL GIVE OUR VIEW ON
THE OTHER US PROPOSALS FOR THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF
NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE
AGREED UPON. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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